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Abstract Following the theoretical notion that tools often
extend one’s body, in the present study, we investigated
whether imitation of hand or tool actions is modulated by
effector-specific information. Subjects performed grasping
actions toward an object with either a handheld tool or their
right hand. Actions were initiated in response to pictures
representing a grip at an object that could be congruent or
incongruent with the required action (grip-type congru-
ency). Importantly, actions could be cued by means of a
tool cue, a hand cue, and a symbolic cue (effector-type
congruency). For both hand and tool actions, an action
congruency effect was observed, reflected in faster reaction
times if the observed grip type was congruent with the
required movement. However, neither hand actions nor
tool actions were differentially affected by the effector
represented in the picture (i.e., when performing a tool
action, the action congruency effect was similar for tool
cues and hand cues). This finding suggests that imitation of
hand and tool actions is effector-independent and thereby
supports generalist rather than specialist theories of
imitation.
Keywords Tools  Imitation  Action observation 
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Introduction
In our daily lives, we often use objects that greatly extend
our bodily action capabilities, such as writing with a pen,
using a hammer, or driving a car. According to an extended
view of cognition, such objects can be considered as an
extension of the human body (Clark 2004). This notion is
exemplified by upper limb amputees who can attain an
amazing degree of control over neural prostheses and who
often consider the prosthesis as a part of their own body
(Schultz and Kuiken 2011).
In addition to these clinical achievements, a growing
number of studies have provided insight into the functional
and neural mechanisms underlying the extension of one’s
body schema to include tools and external objects (for
review, see: Arbib et al. 2009). For instance, in a monkey
study, it was found that the response properties of visuo-
tactile neurons in the anterior intraparietal sulcus (IPS)
changed after the monkey acquired the skill to use a tool as
a rake (Iriki et al. 1996). More specifically, whereas the
initial receptive field of these neurons responded to stimuli
near the hand, after training with the tool, the receptive field
was found extended into more distant space surrounding the
end of the tool. The authors suggested that the use of the
tool extended the representation of the body, by including
the area that could only be reached with the rake. In
humans, comparable effects of tool use have been estab-
lished as well by investigating cross-modal congruency
effects for stimuli presented at the end of a tool (Maravita
et al. 2002; Holmes et al. 2004, 2007). Together these
studies suggest that tool use changes one’s peripersonal
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space—i.e., the space directly surrounding one’s body—via
a process of multisensory integration of information related
to the tool.
Whereas the relation between tool use and changes in
the body schema has been an intensive topic of investiga-
tion, less is known about the mechanisms whereby we learn
to use novel tools. Observational learning and imitation
likely provide important mechanisms to learn novel tool
use that would otherwise take a lot of time and effort
(Massen and Prinz 2009). For instance, as children we
learn how to eat with a knife and a fork by observing our
parents or peers, and as adults we may learn how to operate
the new espresso machine by carefully observing the
actions of our colleagues. The ability to learn by obser-
vation and imitation has received much attention in recent
years (Byrne and Russon 1998; Rizzolatti et al. 2001; Brass
and Heyes 2005; van der Helden et al. 2010). A classical
finding is that participants are faster to execute a movement
after having observed an actor performing the same
movement, even in cases where the observed movement is
irrelevant to the subject’s task (Brass et al. 2000, 2001;
Press et al. 2005; Jonas et al. 2007a). Several studies have
suggested that an important network underlying imitation
and observational learning is formed by the putative mirror
neuron system and more specifically by the inferior frontal
gyrus (IFG; Iacoboni et al. 1999; Kilner et al. 2003; Koski
et al. 2003; Buccino et al. 2004; van der Helden et al.
2010). In contrast, other studies have argued for a more
general involvement of the IFG in perception–action cou-
pling—beyond imitation—(Dassonville et al. 2001; New-
man-Norlund et al. 2007b, 2010). As a consequence, the
precise functional significance of the neural mechanisms
involved in imitation remains a matter of ongoing debate.
Different explanations have been suggested for these
apparently contradictory findings. On the one hand, spe-
cialist theories of imitation suggest that imitation is sub-
served by a special purpose imitation system that evolved
in order to relate observed biological movement to one’s
own motor repertoire (Meltzoff and Moore 1989; Anisfeld
1991; Jones 2009). According to this theory, an important
mechanism underlying imitation is the direct matching of
observed movements unto one’s own motor repertoire. In
other words, based on learned action-effect associations
(i.e., the movement of our own hand results in a perceptual
change in our visual field), the observation of the percep-
tual consequences of an action elicits to some extent the
same motor program as used for bringing about the effect.
Because the kinematics for bringing about a tool action are
quite different from the kinematics of a manual action,
observation of tool and hand actions should activate dif-
ferent motor programs. As a consequence, according to the
specialist view of imitation, tool use imitation should be
different from the imitation of biological actions, as both
rely on different specialized neural systems and involve
different action representations. On the other hand, gen-
eralist theories of imitation suppose that imitation is based
on general cognitive mechanisms of associative learning
and action control that are involved in other tasks as well
(Anisfeld 1991; Brass and Heyes 2005). According to the
generalist view, tool use imitation and biological imitation
should be similar, as both rely on a common neural net-
work involved in perception–action coupling.
The aims of this study were to distinguish between these
two hypotheses and to extend our knowledge about the
relation between tool use and imitation more generally.
Therefore, subjects performed actions either with their
hand or with a handheld tool in separate blocks. We
manipulated the congruency of the grip type observed in
the picture (grip congruency). Importantly, actions could
be performed in response to a tool cue, a hand cue, or a
symbolic cue (effector congruency). In this way, we were
able to measure whether imitation of tool or hand actions is
modulated by effector-specific information.
We used an experimental setup in which the subject was
seated behind a table on which a graspable object was
placed that could be grasped with a full grip or a precision
grip at respectively the lower side or the upper side of the
object. Subjects were instructed to always make a full grip
or a precision grip in response to a color cue represented on
a screen (e.g., green = grasp object at lower side with a
full grip, red = grasp object at upper side with a precision
grip). The color cue was superimposed on different effec-
tors in the picture (i.e., a hand or a tool) that could be in a
spatial position that was congruent or incongruent with
respect to the required action. For instance, in congruent
trials, the color cue was presented at the lower side of the
object that could be grasped with a full grip and the color
instructed the subject to actually grasp the lower side with a
full grip. In incongruent trials, the color cue could for
instance be presented at the upper side of the object that
could be grasped with a precision grip, while the color
instructed the subject to actually grasp the lower side with a
full grip. In this way, we were able to measure the auto-
matic interference effect of observing actions that could be
congruent or incongruent with respect to the planned grip
type and the effector displayed.
Methods
Participants
Twenty-four right-handed healthy adults participated in the
experiment (7 men, mean age = 24.0 years) with normal
or corrected-to-normal vision. Data from 3 participants
were discarded from analysis, as the experiment could not
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be completed. In addition, data from 1 subject were
excluded because of grasping the incorrect object part in
more than 25% of all trials, leaving 19 participants for the
final analysis.
Experimental setup and procedure
Participants were seated in front of a table facing a com-
puter screen at a distance of approximately 100 cm. A
centrally located response box was placed on the partici-
pant’s lap and served as a starting position for the grasping
actions. A custom-made touch-sensitive manipulandum
was attached to the table, consisting of a small cylinder
(r = .08 cm, height = 1.80 cm) on top of a larger cylin-
drical base (r = 3.00 cm, height = 8.00 cm) that could be
grasped with respectively a precision (upper part of object)
and a power grip (lower part of object; see Fig. 1a).
In half of all experimental blocks, subjects grasped the
manipulandum by using a handheld mechanical tool (tool
blocks); in the other half of all blocks, subjects grasped the
manipulandum by using their right hand (hand blocks). The
mechanical tool consisted of a handheld tool that could be
held with a power grip (see Fig. 1 A; tool length = 78 cm;
maximum distance between opened jaws = 8.5 cm). When
using the tool to grasp the manipulandum, the movements
of the hands differed from manual grasping in two ways:
(1) The tool was always held with a full grip, and when
closing the hand (i.e., making a full hand pincer grip), a
handle was pulled resulting in the closing of the jaws. With
hand extension, the handle was released, resulting in the
opening of the jaws of the tool; and (2) The jaws of the tool
were placed in 90 opposition relative to the position of the
hand. During tool blocks, the chair on which the participant
was seated had to be moved backwards, such that the jaws
of the tool ended up in the same position as the initial
position of the subjects’ hands during hand blocks (see
Fig. 1a).
Each trial started with the participant holding the start-
ing button of the response box, either by means of their
index finger (hand blocks) or by means of the base of the
tool (tool blocks). A starting picture appeared for
1,000–1,500 ms, representing the manipulandum and the
actor with both hands out of view (see Fig. 1b). Then the
target stimulus appeared which remained on the screen
until the computer detected a grasping response or a return
to the starting button.
Target stimuli consisted of static pictures representing a
hand cue (hand grasping the manipulandum), a tool cue
(tool grasping the manipulandum), or a symbolic cue (dots
presented near the manipulandum; see Fig. 1b). For hand
cues and tool cues, the effector (the hand or the jaws of the
tool) was colored red or green, by adjusting the color
balance using Photoshop CS5 (Adobe Systems, Inc, CA).
Symbolic cues consisted of red or green dots near the
manipulandum and were included as a control condition to
establish a baseline measure of performing hand and tool
actions in response to unambiguous visual cues. Thus, in
the case of symbolic cues, no effector was represented in
the picture: only the colored dots were visible. Hand cues,
tool cues, and symbolic cues were randomly presented.
Pictures were presented at a size of 1,280 9 1,024 pixels,
Fig. 1 a Experimental setup. Participants were seated behind a table
on which the manipulandum and a screen were placed. Actions were
performed with either the right hand (left picture) or with a handheld
tool (right picture). Stimuli were presented on a screen directly in
front of the participant. b Starting picture representing the manipu-
landum with the actor’s hands out of view (left side) and example
stimuli (right side) used in the tool cue, the hand cue, and the
symbolic cue conditions. Participants were instructed to grasp the
manipulandum with either a precision or a power grip depending on
the color of the stimuli
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resulting in a stimulus size on the screen that matched the
experimental setup in size (i.e., the object, hand, and tool
represented in the picture had a size comparable to their
real counterparts).
The participants were instructed to perform either a
precision or a power grip, based on the color of the cue.
Half of all participants were required to perform a power
grip in response to the color green and a precision grip in
response to the color red. The other half of all participants
received opposite instructions. In this way, participants
were instructed to perform actions that were either con-
gruent or incongruent with respect to the end location and
grip type represented in the picture (e.g., grasping the
upper part of the manipulandum, while observing a cue at
the lower part of the manipulandum). Importantly, the
manipulation to instruct actions based on color cues
ensured that participants were attending both the grip type
and the effector displayed in the picture, even though this
information was task-irrelevant (i.e., the grip type dis-
played was not relevant to the action that the subject was
required to perform). Participants were instructed only to
initiate their movement when they were certain which part
of the object they planned to grasp. All movements were
made with the right hand, and following movement exe-
cution, participants were instructed to hold the object for
about 1 s, without lifting or moving it, after which they
returned to the starting position to initiate the next trial. No
explicit instructions were given with respect to the fixation
while performing the movement, but as it is generally
known that the eyes are often ahead of the hand (Neggers
and Bekkering 2000), subjects most likely fixated on the
target object that they had to grasp. Participants performed
4 blocks of 120 trials each. These blocks consisted of a 2
(action: tool and hand) 9 3 (stimulus: hand cue, tool cue,
or symbolic cue) 9 2 (movement: congruent and incon-
gruent) design, and block order (i.e., tool or hand) was
counterbalanced between participants. In total, the experi-
ment took about 1 h.
The experiment was controlled using Presentation soft-
ware version 12.2 (Neurobehavioral Systems, Davis, CA).
The response box and the manipulandum were connected
to a computer to detect (1) reaction times (time between
target onset and release of the starting position), (2)
movement times (time between release of the starting
position and grasping the manipulandum), and (3) end
position (power or precision grip).
Results
Trials with incorrect responses (i.e., grasping the incorrect
part of the object; 3.4% of all trials), trials in which the
subject did not hold the button at the onset of the picture
(reaction times less than 100 ms; 1.1% of all trials), and
trials exceeding a 2 SD cutoff for each subject’s mean RT
(3.3% of all trials) were excluded from reaction time
analysis. The averaged reaction times, movement times,
and error rates were analyzed using a 2 9 3 9 2 repeated
measures ANOVA with Action (tool and hand), Cue type
(tool, hand, and symbolic) and Congruency (congruent and
incongruent movements) as within-subjects factors. Reac-
tion and movement times are represented in Fig. 2.
For reaction times, a main effect of Congruency, F(1,
18) = 41.9, P \ .001, g2 = .70, reflected slower reaction
times for incongruent (457 ms, SE = 20) compared to
congruent movement cues (441 ms, SE = 18). A main
effect of Cue type, F(2,36) = 28.3, P \ .001, g2 = .61,
reflected faster reaction times to symbolic cues (433 ms,
SE = 17) compared to hand cues (462 ms, SE = 20) and
tool cues (452 ms, SE = 19). The main effect of Action
was not significant (P = .25). No significant interactions
were observed.
For movement times, a significant main effect of Action,
F(1, 18) = 45.7, P \ .001, g2 = .72, reflected that move-
ment times were faster when the actions were performed
with the hand (530 ms, SE = 18) than with the tool
(789 ms, SE = 41). No other main effects or interactions
were found significant for the analysis of movement times.
For the analysis of the error rates (i.e., grasping the
manipulandum at the incorrect part), a significant main
effect of Action, F(1, 18) = 9.0, P \ .01, g2 = .72,
reflected that subjects made slightly more errors (i.e.,
grasping the incorrect part of the object) when using the
tool (4.9%) than when grasping with the hand (1.9%). No
other effects were found significant for the analysis of error
rates.
Discussion
The present study established a classical action congruency
effect for hand actions and tool actions, reflected in faster
responses if the observed movement was the same as the
instructed movement, even though the observed movement
was irrelevant to the subject’s task. Thereby this study
extends previous findings that were based on finger lifting
movements (Brass et al. 2000, 2001) and transitive hand
movements (Newman-Norlund et al. 2007a, 2010; van
Schie et al. 2008) to the domain of tool use.
Importantly, neither hand actions nor tool actions were
differentially affected by the effector represented in the
picture. Thus, when performing a tool action, the action
congruency effect was comparable for cues representing a
tool and a hand. Similarly, when performing a hand action,
no difference was found in the action congruency effect
between cues representing a hand or a tool. These findings
542 Exp Brain Res (2011) 214:539–547
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are in line with previous studies that have reported com-
parable effects of biological and non-biological stimuli on
action imitation (Press et al. 2005; Jansson et al. 2007;
Newman-Norlund et al. 2010). Thereby these findings
support generalist theories of imitation, according to which
imitation is subserved by general cognitive mechanisms of
associative learning and action control (Brass and Heyes
2005; Heyes 2011).
In addition, the finding that tool imitation is not modu-
lated by effector-specific information is in line with several
studies, suggesting that tool use training results in the
acquisition of effector-independent action representations.
For instance, grasping kinematics are often highly
comparable between actions performed with the hand or
with a tool (Gentilucci et al. 2004), and in a recent study, it
was found that observational priming of an action with a
physical device was not influenced by whether the action
was performed with the left or the right arm (Massen
2009). In a recent fMRI study, a comparable activation was
found in the brain’s parieto-frontal grasping network when
subjects planned a hand grasping action or a grasping
action with a handheld tool (Jacobs et al. 2010). In addi-
tion, in monkeys, it was found that grasping neurons in the
ventral premotor cortex represented the outcome of a tool
action rather than the precise kinematics by which the
action was performed (Umilta et al. 2008).
Fig. 2 Reaction and movement times. Graphs at the left represent
RTs and MTs to actions performed with the tool, and graphs at the
right represent RTs and MTs to actions performed with the hand. Bars
on the left represent actions in response to tool cues, bars in the
middle represent actions in response to hand cues, and bars on the
right represent actions in response to symbolic cues. Light bars
represent congruent movements and dark bars incongruent move-
ments. Error bars represent standard errors
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Interestingly, some studies have shown tool-specific
responses in the mirror neuron system (e.g., neurons are
active both when viewing a tool action and executing a
hand action; Ferrari et al. 2005) and during action obser-
vation in humans (Massen and Prinz 2009). One possibility
is that representing tool actions in terms of the outcome
requires a substantial amount of training with the tool—
either by observation or by doing. In this context, it should
be noted that most tool-responsive mirror neurons were
observed in the later phases of the experiment, after which
the monkey had already some experience with tool obser-
vation (Ferrari et al. 2005). Furthermore, grasping neurons
were found similar responsive to the observation of a hand
closure using a pair of normal pliers and a hand opening
using a pair of ‘‘inverse pliers’’ (Umilta et al. 2008). Using
a similar paradigm in humans, it was found that TMS-
evoked motor potentials reflected the outcome of the action
(e.g., the pliers opening or closing) rather than the actual
hand kinematics involved (Cattaneo et al. 2009). Together
these studies support the idea that tool actions are repre-
sented in an effector-independent fashion.
In the present experiment, the effector used for grasping
was varied between blocks, whereas the grip type to be
executed varied within blocks. This design was a logical
consequence of the fact that it is difficult to vary the
effector within blocks (i.e., subject alternating between
hand and tool actions from trial to trial). One possible
confound of this design could be that information about the
grip type was more task-relevant as it varied from trial to
trial, whereas the effector used for grasping remained the
same. In other words, the finding that imitation of hand and
tool actions is effector-independent could be a consequence
of subjects paying more attention to the grip type than to
the effector represented in the picture. Indeed, previous
studies have shown that the saliency of the action feature
observed plays an important role in facilitating imitation
(Bird et al. 2007; Franz et al. 2007). However, in contrast
to many previous imitation studies, it should be noted that
in the present study, only the color of the action cue
determined what action subjects were required to perform,
whereas both the grip type and the effector represented in
the picture were irrelevant to the subject’s task. In fact, the
color cue was always superimposed on the effector, thereby
ensuring that subjects implicitly attended to both the grip
type and the effector. The finding that only information
about the grip type interfered with action imitation, sug-
gests that only task-irrelevant information about the grip
but not about the effector can facilitate or inhibit imitation.
In addition, it should be noted that several studies have
shown that even when both the effector and the end loca-
tion vary within blocks, imitation is mainly modulated by
the end location of the observed action (Bekkering et al.
2000; Wohlschlager et al. 2003; Franz et al. 2007), thereby
providing further support for the notion that the findings
observed in the present study are not an artifact of the
experiment setup.
In the present study, the end location of the action (up or
down) was always concordant with a specific grip type
(precision or full grip). Thus, based on the present study, it
is difficult to determine whether the action congruency
effect was driven mainly by the spatial location (up or
down) or by the grip type (precision or full grip) of the
observed effector. However, in a recent study using a
similar setup (van Schie et al., in prep.), we showed that the
planning of manual grasping actions was more efficient in
response to cues representing information about the end
location than in response to cues representing the grip type
to be performed. In addition, several studies on action
observation have shown that it is easier to attend to goal-
related aspects (i.e., what is the end location of the action?)
than to grip-related aspects of an observed action (i.e.,
which grip is used for grasping the object? Bach et al.
2005; van Elk et al. 2008). Similarly, in the present study, it
is likely that the action congruency effect reflects the
congruence between the observed end location and the
planned end location of the action.
The present study shows that the imitation of tool
actions is effector-independent, as measured with reaction
times. In addition to reaction times, kinematic and/or EMG
measures often provide valuable insight into the precise
dynamics underlying action execution. For instance, with
respect to tool use it has been shown that grasping kine-
matics are often highly comparable between actions per-
formed with the hand or with a tool (Gentilucci et al. 2004).
Although in the present study we did not measure kine-
matics, the finding of an action congruency effect in the
reaction times but not in the movement times suggests that
action congruency mainly affected the planning phase and
not the execution phase of the action (see also: Chong et al.
2009). Typically, reaction times are considered a reliable
measure of how plans for movement sequences are men-
tally represented (Rosenbaum et al. 1984), and faster
reaction times often reflect a more efficient planning pro-
cess. Thus, the finding that especially the reaction times
were affected by the congruency of the observed action is
in line with the action planning-control framework,
according to which the planning phase of an action—which
involves the incorporation of visual and cognitive infor-
mation—occurs within the first few hundred milliseconds
(Glover 2004).
Interestingly, both tool and hand actions were performed
faster in response to symbolic cues compared to hand and
tool cues. Although some previous studies have reported
faster responses to biological compared to non-biological
cues (Brass et al. 2000; Jonas et al. 2007a), in another
imitation study, a comparable advantage of symbolic over
544 Exp Brain Res (2011) 214:539–547
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biological cues was observed (Newman-Norlund et al.
2010). At a neural level, although some studies have sug-
gested that motor-related areas respond preferentially to the
observation of biological movements (Iacoboni et al. 1999;
Perani et al. 2001; Heiser et al. 2003; Kilner et al. 2003; Tai
et al. 2004), other studies have shown that biological and
non-biological movements result in activation in overlap-
ping brain areas (Gazzola et al. 2007; Jonas et al. 2007b).
The apparent inconsistency between these studies may be
related to the stimuli used. In the present experiment, the
symbolic stimuli used were probably more salient than
both the tool stimuli and the hand stimuli, thereby resulting
in faster reaction times.
Previous studies have suggested that an important
mechanism underlying imitation is spatial compatibility,
i.e., the spatial congruence between a stimulus and a
response results in faster reaction times (Aicken et al.
2007; Jansson et al. 2007; van Schie et al. 2008; Catmur
and Heyes 2010). The present study is in line with this
account, as the driving factor underlying the imitation of
both hand and tool actions appears to be the spatial com-
patibility of the action cue with the prepared action, rather
than the effector-specific information represented by the
cue. The finding that both hand and tool actions showed
comparable reaction time effects furthermore supports the
idea that actions are planned primarily in terms of the end
location (i.e., grasping the upper or lower part of the
object) rather than the effector by which the action is
performed. This interpretation is in accordance with the
ideomotor principle according to which actions are repre-
sented primarily in terms of the effects they produce (Prinz
1997; Hommel et al. 2001; Massen and Prinz 2009; Shin
et al. 2010) and fits will with the hierarchical view of the
motor system according to which end locations are an
organizing feature of action planning (Grafton and Ham-
ilton 2007; Rosenbaum et al. 2007). The present study
extends this view to tool actions as well, in line with the
notion that tools often can be considered a natural exten-
sion of the human body (Arbib et al. 2009).
Conclusions
The main finding of the present study is that the imitation
of hand and tool actions is not affected by effector-specific
information. Thereby this study supports generalist rather
than specialist theories of imitation and suggests that imi-
tation is subserved by general cognitive mechanisms, such
as spatial compatibility.
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